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Over the past decade, monetary policy theory and central bank-
ing practice have underscored various desiderata for judicious policy.
It is often argued that social welfare can be improved by arranging
for the central bank to conduct monetary policy according to a suit-
ably chosen instrument rule, dictating how interest rates should be
adjusted in response to particular disturbances to the economy. The
discussions of Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler (1999) and Woodford (2003)
present a coherent theory of monetary policy and make the case for
such rules. In practice, however, monetary policy contends with many
diﬃculties. Among these, the absence of a correctly speciﬁed model
of the economy with which to formulate policy is paramount.
This paper considers a potentially important source of model mis-
speciﬁcation in the design of instrument rules: the assumed manner
in which expectations are formed. The motivation is two-fold. First,
even if rational expectations provide a reasonably accurate descrip-
tion of economic agents’ behavior, a prudent policy should be robust
to small deviations from rationality. Given two policies that both
implement a particular desired equilibrium, the policy that results
in this equilibrium under more general assumptions on expectations
formation is presumably preferred.
Second, some have argued that policies that appear to be desir-
able, because they are consistent with a desirable equilibrium, will
almost surely have disastrous consequences in practice, by allow-
ing self-fulﬁlling expectations to propagate. For example, Friedman
(1968) argued that a monetary policy aimed at pegging the nom-
inal interest rate would inevitably lead to economic instability via
a Wicksellian cumulative process. Moreover, he argued that due to
small implementation errors, this would occur even if the nominal
interest rate target was optimally chosen. The argument proceeds as
follows: Suppose the monetary authority pegs the nominal interest
rate below the natural rate of interest. This policy would give rise
to expectations of future inﬂation, with the resulting lower real rate
of interest tending to stimulate output and prices. Such price rises
would engender expectations of further price inﬂation, in turn further
lowering the expected real rate and so on—generating self-fulﬁlling
expectations of ever higher inﬂation. This paper seeks to build on
the research of Howitt (1992) by providing a formal analysis of such
self-fulﬁlling expectations in the context of a model with optimiz-
ing behavior. Unlike the analysis of Howitt, this paper postulates a
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framework where agents optimally make forecasts of macroeconomic
conditions many periods into the future when making current deci-
sions.
The rational expectations paradigm comprises two stipulations:
(1) agents optimize given their beliefs about the joint probability dis-
tribution for various state variables that are independent of their ac-
tions and that matter for their payoﬀs and (2) the probabilities that
they assign coincide with the predictions of the model. Following a
considerable literature on learning (see Sargent [1993] and Evans and
Honkapohja [2001] for reviews), this paper retains the ﬁrst stipula-
tion while replacing the second with the assumption that the joint
probabilities are formed using an econometric model. The predictions
of this econometric model need not coincide with the predictions of
the theoretical model. The central question posed by the analysis
is whether, given suﬃcient data, the predictions of the econometric
model eventually converge to those of the economic model.
Having departed from the rational expectations paradigm, some
care must be taken in specifying an individual agent’s knowledge.
Agents are assumed to know what they need to know to behave
according to the ﬁrst stipulation above: they know their own pref-
erences and constraints, and, more generally, they correctly under-
stand the mapping from their actions to their expected payoﬀ, given
a probability distribution for the variables that are outside their con-
trol. However, they are not assumed to know anything of the true
economic model of how those variables outside of their control are
determined. For instance, they do not know that other agents have
preferences just like their own and that agents form expectations the
way that they do, even if these things are true within the model. It
therefore is not appropriate to assume agents use knowledge that
other agents’ consumption decisions satisfy a subjective Euler equa-
tion (for example) in deciding what to do themselves. This has the
crucial implication that agents have to make long-horizon forecasts
in the framework proposed by this paper.
Recent work by Bullard and Mitra (2002) and Evans and
Honkapohja (2003) is similarly motivated. These authors, however,
assume a log-linear model of the monetary transmission mechanism
in which agents need only forecast inﬂation and aggregate income
one period in advance. In contrast, this paper assumes that agents
face a multiperiod decision problem, as in the microfoundations used
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in recent analysis of the implications of monetary policy rules under
rational expectations (see Bernanke and Woodford 1997; Clarida,
Gal´ı, and Gertler 1999; and Woodford 1999). This paper demon-
strates that the aggregation of rationally modeled decisions, when
these decisions are based on subjective expectations, does not pre-
dict the aggregate dynamics that depend only on forecasts a single
period in the future, even though the aggregate dynamics under ra-
tional expectations can be described in that way. In fact, in making
current decisions about spending and pricing of their output, agents
must make forecasts of macroeconomic conditions many periods into
the future. This prediction is a direct result of agents not being able
to base their decisions on knowledge of the actions of other agents in
the economy. The central methodological contribution of this paper is
demonstrating that long-horizon forecasts matter in the determina-
tion of current economic conditions in a simple model of output gap
and inﬂation determination with subjective expectations. As such, it
builds on the work of Marcet and Sargent (1989), which shows that
the optimal decision rule in a partial equilibrium model of investment
determination necessarily depends on long-horizon forecasts.
In the model proposed here, learning occurs in the following
manner. Agents conjecture the form of the equilibrium dynamics
of state variables and estimate an econometric model of this form.
This econometric model describes the agents’ perceived law of mo-
tion. The estimated model is then used to evaluate forecasts of the
future paths of state variables that are exogenous to private agents’
decision problems. These forecasts, in conjunction with agents’ opti-
mal decision rules, can be solved to provide a solution for the actual
path of aggregate variables as a function of the current state. This
is the actual law of motion. Each period, this process is repeated as
additional data become available. A principal focus of the analysis is
the manner in which agents update their decision rules, and whether
additional data lead them to adopt perceived laws of motion that
are closer to the actual laws of motion of the economy. In particular,
do agents learn the rational expectations dynamics over time?
The criterion by which this paper judges convergence of learning
dynamics to rational expectations dynamics is the notion of expec-
tational stability, or E-stability, proposed by Evans and Honkapo-
hja (2001). Given the requirements of E-stability and the aggregate
economic dynamics implied by the model’s microfoundations, the
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analysis considers the implications of learning for several standard
prescriptions for monetary policy—speciﬁcally, whether certain pol-
icy rules are able to ensure least-squares convergence to the associ-
ated rational expectations dynamics.
In this paper, monetary policy is speciﬁed as a commitment to
one of two classes of state-contingent instrument rules: (1) nomi-
nal interest-rate rules that depend only on the history of exogenous
disturbances and (2) Taylor rules that specify a path for the nomi-
nal interest rate that depends on the model’s endogenous variables.
The former class of rule is of considerable interest, as it has been
argued to be a natural way to implement optimal monetary policy,
by specifying the optimal action in each possible state of the world.
However, such rules, which include nominal interest-rate pegs as a
special case, are subject to the critique of Friedman (1968) and also
Sargent and Wallace (1975), who showed that commitment to exoge-
nously determined interest-rate paths can lead to multiple rational
expectations equilibria. The latter feedback rules, introduced by Tay-
lor (1993), have been used in monetary policy both as a prescriptive
and descriptive tool. As initially demonstrated by McCallum (1983),
interest-rate rules that possess suﬃcient feedback from endogenous
variables can often deliver a determinate equilibrium. In the present
model under rational expectations, Woodford (2003, chap. 4) shows
that a Taylor rule leads to a determinate equilibrium if the so-called
Taylor principle is satisﬁed.
Two main results emerge from the analysis of learning dynam-
ics. First, interest-rate rules that are speciﬁed as depending only on
the history of exogenous disturbances are not expectationally sta-
ble under learning dynamics. Such rules are therefore subject to
self-fulﬁlling expectations, consistent with the concerns of Friedman
(1968). This, combined with the indeterminacy of rational expecta-
tions equilibrium of this class of policy rule, suggests such rules to
be ineﬀective in eliminating economic instability due to self-fulﬁlling
expectations, and therefore undesirable as a means to implement
optimal monetary policy. Second, for the Taylor rule, expectational
stability hinges critically on satisfaction of the so-called Taylor prin-
ciple (which stipulates that feedback from endogenous variables to
nominal interest rates be suﬃciently strong to ensure that increases
in inﬂation be associated with increases in the real interest rate).
These ﬁndings are invariant to the nature of learning dynamics
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considered and suggest the Taylor principle to be a remarkably ro-
bust feature of the policy environment in the context of this model.
The analysis of this paper is most closely related to the work of
Bullard and Mitra (2002) and Evans and Honkapohja (2003), who
analyze a log-linear model of the monetary transmission mechanism,
where agents forecast inﬂation and aggregate spending one period
in advance.1 The latter show that instrument rules that require the
nominal interest rate to respond only to the history of exogenous dis-
turbances are not stable under learning dynamics. Moreover, they
show how to implement the optimal rational expectations equilib-
rium when the monetary authority is constrained to be a discre-
tionary optimizer and that this equilibrium is also E-stable. Bullard
and Mitra (2002) show in the same model that for a monetary au-
thority that is assumed to be able to commit to a number of Taylor-
type interest-rate rules, the associated rational expectations equi-
librium is E-stable under learning dynamics so long as the Taylor
principle is satisﬁed. That these ﬁndings concur with the results of
this paper is not necessarily to be expected. The presence of long-
horizon forecasts in the present paper gives rise to dynamics that are
distinct from those predicted by these analyses.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 sketches the microfoun-
dations of a simple dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model
under a general assumption on expectations, provides commentary
on the irreducibility of long-horizon forecasts, and highlights some
attractive features of the framework proposed to model learning dy-
namics. Section 2 develops the expectations formation mechanism
adopted in this paper. Section 3 discusses the notion of expectational
stability and provides a simple abstract example of learning analy-
sis. Section 4 considers the robustness of some common prescriptions
for monetary policy to the presence of learning dynamics. The ﬁnal
section concludes.
1. The Framework
To develop a framework suitable for the analysis of monetary pol-
icy under alternative assumptions on expectations formation, we
1See also Bullard and Mitra (2000), Evans and Honkapohja (2002), Honkapo-
hja and Mitra (2004), and Honkapohja and Mitra (2005) for further analyses of
issues in monetary policy under learning dynamics in the same framework.
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make use of a simple dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model
with microfoundations found in Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler (1999)
and Woodford (2003). To simplify the exposition, the analysis ab-
stracts from monetary frictions that would allow money to be held
despite being dominated in rate of return, as in the “cashless” base-
line model developed in Woodford (2003, chap. 2). The model is
developed in several steps. The household’s intertemporal alloca-
tion problem is considered, followed by the ﬁrm’s optimal pricing
problem. The implications of the assumed expectations formation
mechanism for monetary policy are then explored.
1.1 Household’s Intertemporal Problem
The economy is populated by a continuum of households that seek
to maximize future expected discounted utility
Eˆit
∞∑
T=t
βT−t
U(CiT ; ξT )− 1∫
0
v(hiT (j); ξT )dj
 , (1)
where utility depends on a consumption index, Cit , of the economy’s
available goods (to be speciﬁed); a vector of aggregate preference
shocks, ξt; and the amount of labor supplied for the production of
each good j, hi(j). The second term in the brackets therefore cap-
tures the total disutility of labor supply. The consumption index,
Cit , is the Dixit-Stiglitz constant-elasticity-of-substitution aggrega-
tor of the economy’s available goods and has an associated price
index written, respectively, as
Cit ≡
 1∫
0
cit(j)
θ−1
θ dj

θ
θ−1
and Pt ≡
 1∫
0
pt(j)1−θdj

1
1−θ
,
where θ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between any two goods,
and cit(j) and pt(j) denote household i’s consumption and the price
of good j. The absence of real money balances from the period util-
ity function (1) reﬂects the assumption that there are no transaction
frictions that can be mitigated by holding money balances. However,
agents may nonetheless choose to hold money if it provides compa-
rable returns to other available ﬁnancial assets.
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Eˆit denotes the subjective beliefs of household i about the prob-
ability distribution of the model’s state variables—that is, variables
that are beyond agents’ control, though relevant to their decision
problems. The presence of a hat, “ˆ”, denotes nonrational expecta-
tions, and the special case of rational expectations will be denoted
by the usual notation, Et. Beliefs are assumed to be homogenous
across households for the purposes of this paper (though this is not
understood to be the case by agents) and to satisfy standard prob-
ability laws so that EˆitEˆ
i
t+1 = Eˆ
i
t . In forming beliefs about future
events, agents do not take into account that they will update their
own beliefs in subsequent periods, and this is the source of nonra-
tional behavior in this model. However, when households solve their
decision problem at time t, beliefs held at that time satisfy standard
probability laws, so that standard solution methods apply. The spe-
ciﬁc details of beliefs and the manner in which agents update beliefs
are developed in section 2. The discount factor is assumed to satisfy
0 < β < 1. The function U(Ct; ξt) is concave in Ct for a given value
of ξt, and v(ht(i); ξt) is convex in ht(i) for a given value of ξt.
Asset markets are assumed to be incomplete: there is a single
one-period riskless nonmonetary asset available to transfer wealth
intertemporally. Under this assumption, the household’s ﬂow budget
constraint can be written as
M it +B
i
t ≤
(
1 + imt−1
)
M it−1+(1 + it−1)B
i
t−1+PtY
i
t −Tt−PtCit , (2)
where M it denotes the household’s end-of-period holdings of money,
Bit denotes the household’s end-of-period nominal holdings of
riskless bonds, imt and it are the nominal interest rates paid on
money balances and bonds held at the end of period t, Y it is the
period income (real) of households, and Tt denotes lump sum taxes
and transfers. The household receives income in the form of wages
paid, w(j), for labor supplied in the production of each good, j. Fur-
thermore, all households i are assumed to own an equal part of each
ﬁrm and therefore receive a common share of proﬁts Πt(j) from the
sale of each ﬁrm’s good j (though agents do not know this to be
true). Period nominal income is therefore determined as
PtY
i
t =
1∫
0
[wt(j)hit(j) + Πt (j)]dj
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for each household i. The ﬂow budget constraint indicates that ﬁ-
nancial assets at the end of period t can be no more than the value of
assets brought into this period, plus nonﬁnancial income after taxes
and consumption spending. This constraint must hold in all future
dates and states of uncertainty. Fiscal policy is assumed to be Ricar-
dian so that goods prices, asset prices, and output are determined
independently of ﬁscal variables.2 It will be assumed that the ﬁscal
authority pursues a zero-debt policy, so that bonds are in zero net
supply.
To summarize, the household’s problem in each period t is to
choose
{
cit(j), h
i
t (j) ,M
i
t , B
i
t
}
for all j ∈ [0, 1] so as to maximize
(1) subject to the constraint (2), taking as parametric the variables{
pT (j), wT (j), ΠT , iT−1, imT−1, ξT
}
for T ≥ t. The ﬁrst-order con-
ditions characterizing the solution to this optimization problem are
detailed in appendix 1.
1.1.1 A Consumption Rule Derived
In order to derive a linear decision rule describing the household’s
optimal intertemporal allocation of consumption, a log-linear ap-
proximation to the household’s ﬁrst-order conditions is employed.
Appendix 1 shows that a log-linear approximation to the household’s
Euler equation and the intertemporal budget constraint imply the
relations
Cˆit = Eˆ
i
tCˆ
i
t+1 − σ(ˆıt − Eˆit πˆt+1) + gt − Eˆitgt+1 (3)
and
Eˆit
∞∑
T=t
βT−tCˆiT = 
i
t + Eˆ
i
t
∞∑
T=t
βT−tYˆ iT , (4)
where σ ≡ −Uc/(UccC¯) is the intertemporal elasticity of substitu-
tion, gt ≡ σUcξξt/Uc, and where for any variable zt, zˆt ≡ ln(zt/z¯)
denotes the log deviation of the variable from its steady-state value,
z¯, deﬁned in appendix 1. it ≡ W it /(PtY¯ ) is the share of the
household’s real wealth as a fraction of steady-state income, where
W it ≡ (1 + it−1)Bit−1. Solving (3) backwards recursively from date
T to date t and taking expectations at that time gives
2Preston (2002) considers the ﬁscal theory of the price level under learning
dynamics.
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EˆitCˆ
i
T = Cˆ
i
t − gt + Eˆit
[
gT + σ
T−1∑
T=t
(ˆıt − πˆt+1)
]
,
which on substitution into the intertemporal budget constraint yields
Cˆit = (1− β)it + Eˆit
∞∑
T=t
βT−t
×
[
(1− β)Yˆ iT − βσ(ˆıT − πˆT+1) + β(gT − gT+1)
]
(5)
as the desired decision rule: it describes optimal behavior given ar-
bitrary beliefs (so long as such beliefs satisfy standard probability
laws). It follows that households necessarily make long-horizon fore-
casts of macroeconomic conditions to determine their optimal cur-
rent consumption choice. Consumption varies across households ac-
cording to diﬀerences in wealth and income. Section 5 discusses why
optimizing agents necessarily make decisions according to (5), rather
than just making use of the Euler equation (3) as has been assumed
in the recent literature.
It is useful to contrast this derived decision rule to the predicted
consumption allocation under the permanent income hypothesis. In-
deed, the ﬁrst two terms capture precisely the basic insight of the
permanent income hypothesis that agents should consume a constant
fraction of the expected future discounted wealth, given a constant
real interest rate equal to β−1 − 1. The third term arises from the
assumption of a time-varying real interest rate, and represents de-
viations from this constant real rate due to either variation in the
nominal interest rate or inﬂation. The ﬁnal term results from allow-
ing stochastic disturbances to the economy.
To determine aggregate behavior, integrate over i to give
Cˆt = Eˆt
∞∑
T=t
βT−t
[
(1− β)YˆT − βσ(ˆıT − πˆT+1) + β(gT − gT+1)
]
,
using the fact that
∫
i 
i
tdi = 0 from market clearing (bonds are
in zero net supply) and introducing the notation
∫
i z
i
tdi = zt for
any variable z and, speciﬁcally,
∫
i Eˆ
i
tdi = Eˆt to deﬁne the average
expectations operator. (In aggregating, we have made use of the
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equilibrium property that all agents will receive the same wage for
each type of labor supplied. Since all agents hold the same diversiﬁed
portfolio of ﬁrm proﬁts, it is necessarily true that Yˆ it = Yˆ
j
t for all
i, j and we call this common income stream Yˆt.) It is important
to note that the expectations operator, Eˆt, possesses no behavioral
content, and simply deﬁnes the average expectations of a distribution
of agents in the economy. That this is true follows immediately from
the assumed knowledge of agents: they do not know the tastes and
beliefs of other agents in the economy and therefore do not have
a complete economic model with which to infer the true aggregate
probability laws and how state variables beyond their control are
determined.
Since equilibrium requires Cˆt = Yˆt, the aggregation of household
decision rules can be written in terms of the output gap, xt ≡ Yˆt−Yˆ nt ,
to give
xt = Eˆt
∞∑
T=t
βT−t [(1− β)xT+1 − σ(ˆıT − πˆT+1) + rnT ] , (6)
where Yˆ nt is the natural rate of output (to be deﬁned) and r
n
t ≡
(Yˆ nt+1−gt+1)−(Yˆ nt −gt) is a composite of exogenous disturbances. The
current output gap is therefore determined by the current nominal
interest rate and exogenous disturbance and the average of house-
holds’ long-horizon forecasts of both these variables and also output
and inﬂation into the indeﬁnite future.
1.2 Optimal Price Setting
Now consider the ﬁrm’s problem, again relegating details to the ap-
pendix. Calvo price setting is assumed so that a fraction 0 < α < 1
of goods prices are held ﬁxed in any given period, while a fraction
1− α of goods prices are adjusted. Given homogeneity of beliefs, all
ﬁrms having the opportunity to change their price in period t face
the same decision problem and therefore set a common price p∗t . The
Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate price index must therefore evolve according
to the relation
Pt =
[
αP 1−θt−1 + (1− α) p∗1−θt
] 1
1−θ
. (7)
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Firms setting prices in period t face a demand curve yt(i) =
Yt(pt(i)/Pt)−θ for their good and take aggregate output Yt and ag-
gregate prices Pt as parametric. Good i is produced using a single
labor input h(i) according to the relation yt(i) = Atf(ht(i)), where
At is an exogenous technology shock and the function f (·) satisﬁes
the standard Inada conditions.
When setting prices in period t, ﬁrms are assumed to value future
streams of income at the marginal value of aggregate income in terms
of the marginal value of an additional unit of aggregate income today.
That is, a unit of income in each state and date T is valued by the
stochastic discount factor
Qt,T = βT−t · Pt
PT
· Uc(YT , ξT )
Uc(Yt; ξt)
.
This simplifying assumption is appealing in the context of the sym-
metric equilibrium that is examined in this model. Since all agents
are assumed to have common beliefs and tastes, and because all
households are assumed to own an equal share of ﬁrm proﬁts, it
follows that in equilibrium each receives a common income stream
that is necessarily equal to aggregate income. Having ﬁrms value
future proﬁts at the marginal value of aggregate income therefore
corresponds to each shareholder’s valuation.3
The ﬁrm’s price-setting problem in period t is therefore to max-
imize the expected present discounted value of proﬁts
Eˆit
∞∑
T=t
αT−tQt,T
[
ΠiT (pt(i))
]
, (8)
where
ΠiT (p) = YtP
θ
t p
1−θ − wt(i)f−1(YtP θt p−θ/At), (9)
with the notation f−1 (·) denoting the inverse function of f (·). The
factor αT−t in the ﬁrm’s objective function is the probability that
3This assumption is not particularly important. In the employed log-linear
approximation, ﬁrms only use knowledge of the long-run average value of Qt,T ,
which equals the discount factor β. So long as ﬁrms know β, any number of
assumptions on the price-setting behavior of ﬁrms would be consistent with the
presented analysis. Firms could hold diﬀerent beliefs about ﬂuctuations in Qt,T
so long as they all know the long-run average to be equal to β.
Vol. 1 No. 2 Learning about Monetary Policy Rules 93
the ﬁrm will not be able to adjust its price for the next (T − t)
periods.
To summarize, the ﬁrm’s problem is to choose {pt (i)} to max-
imize (8), taking as given the variables {YT , PT , wT (j), AT , Qt,T }
for T ≥ t and j ∈ [0, 1]. The ﬁrst-order conditions characterizing
optimality are contained in appendix 2.
1.2.1 Price Decision Rule Derived
As for the household problem, we seek a log-linear approximation
to ﬁrms’ price-setting behavior. Appendix 2 demonstrates that the
ﬁrst-order condition of the ﬁrm’s optimal pricing problem satisﬁes
the approximate log-linear relation
p̂∗t (i) = Eˆ
i
t
∞∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t
[
1− αβ
1 + ωθ
· (ω + σ−1)xT + αβπˆT+1
]
, (10)
where ω > 0 is the elasticity of ﬁrm i’s real marginal cost function
(deﬁned in the appendix) with respect to its own output, yt (i). Thus
ﬁrm i’s optimal price is determined as a linear function of the future
expected paths of the output gap and inﬂation. Analogously to the
household’s problem, ﬁrms optimally make long-horizon forecasts of
general macroeconomic conditions in deciding their current price,
p∗t (i).
To infer the aggregate implications of the maintained theory of
pricing, integrate (10) over i to give
p̂∗t = Eˆt
∞∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t
[
1− αβ
1 + ωθ
· (ω + σ−1)xT + αβπˆT+1
]
.
Noting that a log-linear approximation to the price index (7) gives
πˆt = p̂∗t · (1− α)/α, the above expression can be written as
πˆt = κxt + Eˆt
∞∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t [καβ · xT+1 + (1− α)βπˆT+1] , (11)
where
κ ≡ (1− α)
α
1− αβ
1 + ωθ
(ω + σ−1) > 0.
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Equation (11) indicates that current inﬂation is determined by to-
day’s output gap and the average of ﬁrms’ expectations of the future
time path of both the output gap and the inﬂation rate. As for the
households’ problem, since private agents do not know the tastes
and beliefs of others and therefore are unable to infer the true ag-
gregate probability laws, this relation cannot be quasi-diﬀerenced
to deliver a relationship between current inﬂation and expectations
of next period’s inﬂation rate. To simplify notation, for the re-
mainder of the paper the “ˆ” is omitted, with the understanding
that all variables are deﬁned as log deviations from steady-state
values.
It is worth noting that the foregoing methodology is not spe-
ciﬁc to the model at hand. Diﬀerent theories of price setting or
consumer behavior could be adopted. For instance, perfect competi-
tion could be assumed to give fully ﬂexible prices. Alternatively, it
could be assumed that some fraction γ of ﬁrms have ﬂexible prices,
while a fraction 1 − γ set prices a period in advance. This would
give the Lucas supply curve, as shown by Woodford (2003, chap.
3). Long-horizon forecasts do not matter under these theories of
pricing because ﬁrms do not face a multiperiod decision problem—
they are static and two-period problems, respectively. Assuming
Calvo pricing is a tractable way to develop a minimally realistic
model for the analysis of monetary policy and facilitates comparison
to the recent literature on monetary policy and learning. It is an
open question whether other, possibly more realistic theories of pric-
ing have important implications for monetary policy under learning
dynamics.
1.3 The Irreducibility of Long-Horizon Forecasts
A number of previous papers have proposed analyses of learning
dynamics in the context of models where agents solve multiperiod
(indeed, inﬁnite horizon) decision problems, but without requiring
that agents make forecasts regarding outcomes more than one pe-
riod in the future. In these papers, agents’ decisions depend only on
forecasts of future variables that appear in the Euler equations that
can be used to characterize rational expectations equilibrium. For
example, Bullard and Mitra (2002) propose an analysis of learning
dynamics in a model that is intended to have the same underlying
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microfoundations as the model presented above—that is, intended
to consider the consequences of least-squares learning in the context
of the standard New Keynesian model of inﬂation and output gap
determination. However, section 1 demonstrates that under learning
dynamics, private-sector optimization implies the aggregate struc-
tural relations (6) and (11) so that long-horizon expectations of gen-
eral macroeconomic conditions matter for the evolution of aggregate
output and inﬂation.
Since these relations hold for arbitrary beliefs satisfying stan-
dard probability laws, they must also hold under rational expec-
tations. Under this assumption, (6) and (11) can be simpliﬁed by
application of the law of iterated expectations, as agents—having
complete knowledge of the tastes and beliefs of other agents—are
able to compute the equilibrium probabilities and associated laws,
ensuring that individual beliefs coincide with the aggregate proba-
bility laws implied by the economic model. Leading the aggregate
demand relation (6) one period and taking rational expectations at
date t gives
Etxt+1 = EtEt+1
∞∑
T=t+1
βT−t−1 [(1− β)xT+1 − σ(iT − πT+1) + rnT ]
= Et
∞∑
T=t+1
βT−t−1 [(1− β)xT+1 − σ(iT − πT+1) + rnT ] ,
(12)
where the second equality follows from the law of iterated expecta-
tions. It follows that
xt = Et[(1− β)xt+1 − σ(it − πt+1) + rnt ] +
Et
∞∑
T=t+1
βT−t [(1− β)xT+1 − σ(β · iT − πT+1) + rnT ]
= Et[(1− β)xt+1 − σ(it − πt+1) + rnt ] + βEtxt+1
= Etxt+1 − σ(it − Etπt+1) + rnt ,
where the second equality makes use of (12). Similar manipulations
for the Phillips curve relation give the rational expectations model
of the monetary transmission mechanism
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xt = Etxt+1 − σ(it − Etπt+1) + rnt
πt = κxt + βEtπt+1.
This simple model of the economy has been used in recent studies
of monetary policy rules by Bernanke and Woodford (1997), Clarida,
Gal´ı, and Gertler (1999), and Woodford (1999). A rational expecta-
tions equilibrium analysis therefore predicts that only one-period-
ahead forecasts of inﬂation and the output gap matter for the evolu-
tion of the economy. The approach of Bullard and Mitra (2002) is to
take these relations and replace the rational expectations assump-
tion with the learning assumption outlined in section 2. This gives
the system
xt = Eˆtxt+1 − σ(it − Eˆtπt+1) + rnt (13)
πt = κxt + βEˆtπt+1, (14)
obtained by substituting the rational expectations operator, Et, with
the learning dynamics operator, Eˆt. But the system (13)–(14) is not
equivalent to the model consisting of equations (6) and (11) under
most possible speciﬁcations of subjective expectations.
The proposed learning procedure has the advantage that if the
econometric model used by agents to produce forecasts is correctly
speciﬁed, then the resulting behavior is asymptotically optimal. That
is, behavior under the learning algorithm diﬀers from what would be
optimal behavior under the true probability laws by an amount that
is eventually arbitrarily small. For the examined monetary policies,
a correctly speciﬁed econometric model posits inﬂation, output, and
the nominal interest rate to be linear functions of the lagged natural
rate disturbance, with a residual term orthogonal to the natural rate.
The consistency of the ordinary least squares estimator implies that
the coeﬃcients that agents use in forming their beliefs are eventually
close to the true coeﬃcients. Since the optimal decision rule is a
continuous function of the coeﬃcients of the agents’ forecasting rule,
beliefs that are arbitrarily close to the correct ones imply behavior
that is arbitrarily close to being optimal.
In general, this is not a property of the Euler equation approach.
To make this clear, recall that the optimal decision rule is given by
C˜it = (1− β)it + Eˆit
∞∑
T=t
βT−t [(1− β)xT − βσ(iT − πT+1) + βrnT ] ,
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where we have deﬁned C˜it ≡ Cit−Y nt . Agents having a positive initial
wealth endowment, it > 0, will have higher than average consump-
tion (given that the income process is the same for all agents in
the equilibrium described in section 1), while those having a nega-
tive initial wealth endowment, it < 0, will have lower than average
consumption.
It is immediate, then, that using the Euler equation alone can-
not lead individual households to make the optimal consumption
allocation each period, since it does not lead them to take account
of their wealth in any way whatsoever. Suppose we interpret the Eu-
ler equation (13) as saying that household i forecasts the aggregate
output gap, xt+1, then bases its consumption decision C˜it on this, so
that
C˜it = Eˆ
i
txt+1 − σ(it − Eˆitπt+1) + rnt (15)
describes household behavior. Such a procedure will lead to system-
atic underconsumption by households with it > 0 and overconsump-
tion of those households with it < 0. If the Euler equation approach
is instead interpreted as saying that the household forecasts its own
future consumption C˜it+1 (based on the past time series of own con-
sumption spending) and then bases current consumption on this,
we have
C˜it = Eˆ
i
tC˜
i
t+1 − σ(it − Eˆitπt+1) + rnt , (16)
and similar conclusions present themselves.4
Such suboptimal behavior is a manifestation of the following
more general point: forecasting EˆitC˜
i
t+1 as Eˆ
i
txt+1 is internally in-
consistent with household optimization. It represents a forecast of
the agent’s own future decision that diﬀers from what it expects to
be optimal given its current forecasts of future income, inﬂation, and
interest rates and given the agent’s understanding of its own deci-
sion rule. Moreover, if agents have internally consistent beliefs, such
forecasts would diﬀer from what the agent should now be forecasting
4Note that under this proposed learning mechanism, the interpretation of
Eˆit is distinct from the behavior postulated in this paper: agents, rather than
forecasting future state variables that are beyond their control though pertinent
to their decision problem, adopt a pure statistical model of their own future
consumption choice—expectations are not taken with respect to the probability
distribution induced by the optimal decision rule and beliefs about exogenous
state variables.
98 International Journal of Central Banking September 2005
about their own period t + 1 forecasts. Forecasts of this kind there-
fore represent a less sophisticated approach to forecasting, because
they fail to make use of information that the agent necessarily pos-
sesses. The model of learning proposed in this paper induces a
more sophisticated approach to forecasting that ensures consistency
among the various things that the agent is assumed to simultaneously
believe.
As an example, consider the model in the case of a zero initial
wealth endowment. The optimal decision rule is
C˜it = Eˆ
i
t
∞∑
T=t
βT−t [(1− β)xT − βσ(iT − πT+1) + βrnT ] .
Since in the optimal program this rule governs consumption decisions
in all future periods, it follows that households expect next period’s
optimal consumption choice to be
EˆitC˜
i
t+1 = Eˆ
i
t
∞∑
T=t+1
βT−t [(1− β)xT − βσ(iT − πT+1) + βrnT ] , (17)
obtained by forwarding the optimal decision rule one period and
taking expectations at time t. It follows immediately that for the
Euler equation to provide the optimal consumption allocation, un-
der the interpretations in the preceding paragraph given to (15) or
(16) above, Eˆitxt+1 and Eˆ
i
tC˜t+1, respectively, must coincide with this
optimal forecast given by (17). But in general, there is no reason for
forecasts of xt+1 and C˜it+1 constructed from regression of past ob-
servations of these variables on observed aggregate disturbances to
coincide with (17). The optimal forecast is a particular linear combi-
nation of forecasts of the state variables relevant to the household’s
decision problem. Importantly, such forecasts will only coincide in
a rational expectations equilibrium; that is, when agents know the
true probability laws—the very laws agents are attempting to learn.
Thus consumption decisions made according to either Euler equation
(15) or (16) lead to suboptimal behavior.
Honkapohja, Mitra, and Evans (2002) argue that such Euler
equations can be derived from the framework of this paper (in the
case of zero initial wealth endowments) with the additional assump-
tion that agents understand that market clearing requires C˜it = xt
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(or Cit = Yt) in all periods. While this assumption might appear ap-
pealing in the context of a model with homogenous agents that are
constrained in equilibrium to consume identical incomes, more gener-
ally it lacks appeal on two grounds. First, market-clearing conditions
are part of the set of rational expectations equilibrium restrictions
that agents are attempting to learn—why are they any more likely
to be endowed with knowledge of one restriction over another? This
will be particularly important in more general models when agents
receive diﬀering income streams and have incentives to trade assets
in equilibrium. Second, even if it is assumed that agents are aware
of this market-clearing condition, so that the Euler equation of the
form (15) can be derived, such a decision rule does not describe
optimal behavior: households would never choose to adopt such a
learning rule given the maintained assumption that agents optimize
conditional on their beliefs.
2. Expectations Formation
The previous section derives the aggregate implications of house-
hold and ﬁrm behavior. Equation (6) speciﬁes the evolution of aggre-
gate demand, while equation (11) is analogous to a forward-looking
Phillips curve determining current inﬂation as a function of expected
future inﬂation and the output gap. To close this stylized model
of the macroeconomy, assumptions on the expectations formation
mechanism and the nature of monetary policy—which determines
the evolution of the nominal interest rate {it}—are required. Given
expectations, so long as monetary policy is speciﬁed as being de-
termined by the model’s exogenous variable and/or permitted to
depend only on the endogenous variables, inﬂation, and the output
gap (including future expected and past values), then this equation
together with (6) and (11) is suﬃcient to determine {πt, xt, it} . The
monetary policies considered in this paper satisfy this requirement.
It remains to specify the expectations formation mechanism.
2.1 Recursive Learning
To be precise about the learning dynamics of this model, adjoin an
equation for the interest rate to equations (6) and (11) to give the
system
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xt = −σit + Eˆt
∞∑
T=t
βT−t [(1− β)xT+1 − σ(β · iT+1 − πT+1) + rnT ]
(18)
πt = κxt + Eˆt
∞∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t [καβ · xT+1 + (1− α)β · πT+1] (19)
it = i(x, π, rn). (20)
The ﬁnal equation deﬁnes a general speciﬁcation for monetary pol-
icy that satisﬁes the requirements discussed above. Conditional on
expectations, there are three equations that determine the three un-
known endogenous variables {πt, xt, it} . It is clear from equations
(18) and (19) that agents require forecasts of the entire future path of
each endogenous variable. Agents therefore estimate a linear model
in inﬂation, the output gap, and the nominal interest rate, using as
regressors variables that appear in the minimum-state-variable so-
lution to the model under rational expectations. This conjectured
model represents agents’ beliefs of the equilibrium dynamics of the
model’s state variables.5
Under the classes of monetary policies considered in section 4, the
minimum-state-variable solution is always linear in the disturbance
term, rnt . Suppose the natural rate of interest, r
n
t , is determined by
the stochastic process
rnt = f
′st,
where
st = Cst−1 + εs,t (21)
5One might query the assumption that agents construct forecasts using just
variables that appear in the minimum-state-variable solution. After all, it is clear
from the optimizing model developed that agents also observe (simultaneously)
aggregate output and prices when making their own decisions about consumption
and price setting. It follows that these aggregate variables might be thought
useful in constructing forecasts about the future evolution of the economy. This
informational assumption leads to the same substantive conclusions on E-stability
as the case in which agents do not use this additional information, and results
are available from the author. To keep the ideas at the fore and the algebra at
bay, the main analysis works under the assumption that forecasts are constructed
using only variables that appear in the minimum-state-variable solution.
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and st is an (n× 1) vector, f is an (n× 1) coeﬃcient vector, εs,t is an
i.i.d disturbance vector, and C is a matrix with all eigenvalues being
real and inside the unit circle. Thus the natural rate shock is speciﬁed
as a fairly arbitrary linear combination of exogenous disturbances.
Deﬁning zt ≡ (πt, xt, it)′ , the estimated linear model is assumed
to be
zt = at + bt · st + t,
where t is the usual error term and (at, bt) are coeﬃcient vectors
of dimension (3× 1) and (3× n) , respectively. The estimation pro-
cedure makes use of the entire history of available data in period t,
{zt, 1, st}t−10 . As additional data become available in subsequent pe-
riods, agents update their estimates of the coeﬃcients (at, bt) . This
is neatly represented as the recursive least-squares formulation
φt = φt−1 + t
−1R−1t wt−1(zt−1 − φ′t−1wt−1) (22)
Rt = Rt−1 + t−1(wt−1w′t−1 −Rt−1), (23)
where the ﬁrst equation describes how the forecast coeﬃcients, φt =
(a′t, vec(bt)′)
′, are updated with each new data point and the second
equation describes the evolution of the matrix of second moments of
the appropriately stacked regressors wt ≡ {1, st}t0. The forecasts can
then be constructed as
EˆtzT = at−1 + bt−1 · CT−t · st (24)
for T ≥ t. The matrix C is assumed to be known to agents for
algebraic convenience. This is not important to the conclusions of
this paper—all results hold when agents have to learn the nature of
the autoregressive process describing st, and the results are available
from the author. That agents form beliefs using (24) makes clear their
irrationality—at time t, agents make use of an econometric model to
assign probabilities to the evolution of state variables that does not
account for their own subsequent updating of beliefs at t+ 1 by use
of (22) and (23). This completes the description of the model.
To summarize, the model of the macroeconomy comprises an
aggregate demand equation, (6); a Phillips curve, (11); a monetary
policy rule; and the forecasting system (22), (23), and (24).
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3. Analyzing Learning Dynamics
Subsequent analysis answers two related questions for a given as-
sumption on monetary policy: Under what conditions does a unique
rational expectations equilibrium obtain? And, given the existence
of such an equilibrium, what conditions guarantee convergence to
this equilibrium when agents’ expectations are formed using a recur-
sive least-squares algorithm rather than using rational expectations?
While analysis of determinacy is now commonplace in the monetary
policy literature, the conditions for convergence under least-squares
learning dynamics are less familiar.6 The criterion adopted in this
paper to judge convergence under recursive learning is the notion of
expectational stability of rational expectations equilibrium, called E-
stability by Evans and Honkapohja (2001). Evans and Honkapohja
show that local real-time convergence of a broad class of dynamic
models under recursive learning is governed by E-stability. The fol-
lowing section draws on Evans and Honkapohja (2001) to develop
the ideas of E-stability.
3.1 Expectational Stability
Agents use their econometric model to construct forecasts of the
future path of endogenous variables. For expositional purposes, this
subsection assumes the evolution of rnt is a standard AR(1) process,
with coeﬃcient |ρ| < 1. If monetary policy is conducted so that the
minimum-state-variable solution is linear in rnt , then forecasts can
be constructed using
EˆtzT = at−1 + bt−1 · ρT−t · rnt
for T ≥ t. To obtain the actual evolution of the economy, substitute
(24) into the system of equations (18), (19), and (20). Collecting like
terms gives a general expression of the form
zt = (Q + Aat−1) + (Bbt−1 + D) rnt ,
where the matrices A and B collect coeﬃcients on the estimated
parameter vectors (a′t, b′t), Q collects constant terms, and D collects
6See Blanchard and Kahn (1980) for a detailed discussion of the conditions
for uniqueness of rational expectations equilibrium.
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remaining coeﬃcients on the state variable, rnt . Leading this expres-
sion one period and taking expectations (rational) provides
Etzt+1 = (Q + Aat−1) + ρ (Bbt−1 + D) rnt ,
which describes the optimal rational forecast conditional on private-
sector behavior. Comparison with (24) makes clear that agents are
estimating a misspeciﬁed model of the economy—agents assume a
stationary model when in fact the true model has time-varying coef-
ﬁcients. Taken together with (24) at T = t+1, it deﬁnes a mapping
that determines the optimal forecast coeﬃcients given the current
private-sector forecast parameters (a′t−1, b′t−1), written as
T (at−1, bt−1) = (Q + Aat−1, Bbt−1 + D). (25)
A rational expectations equilibrium (REE) is a ﬁxed point of this
mapping. For such REE, we are then interested in asking, under
what conditions does an economy with learning dynamics converge
to this equilibrium? Using stochastic approximation methods, Evans
and Honkapohja (2001) show that the conditions for convergence
of the learning algorithm (22) and (23) are neatly characterized by
the local stability properties of the associated ordinary diﬀerential
equation
d
dτ
(a, b) = T (a, b)− (a, b), (26)
where τ denotes “notional” time. The REE is said to be expectation-
ally stable, or E-stable, if this diﬀerential equation is locally stable
in the neighborhood of the REE. From standard results for ordinary
diﬀerential equations, a ﬁxed point is locally asymptotically stable if
all eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix D [T (a, b)− (a, b)] have neg-
ative real parts (where D denotes the diﬀerentiation operator and
the Jacobian understood to be evaluated at the rational expecta-
tions equilibrium of interest). See Evans and Honkapohja (2001) for
further details on expectational stability.
In the context of the above model, the Jacobian matrices are
(A− I) and (B − I) and have dimension (3 × 3) (corresponding to
the number of state variables that agents are forecasting). For such
matrices to have roots all having negative real parts, the coeﬃcients
of the associated characteristic equation must satisfy three restric-
tions. It follows that E-stability imposes six restrictions on model
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parameters. Details of these conditions are provided in appendix 3.
The remainder of the paper concerns itself with the relationship be-
tween the conditions for expectational stability and the requirements
for determinacy when monetary policy is speciﬁed as a commitment
to a variety of interest-rate rules.
4. Monetary Policy and Learning
The ﬁrst part of this paper develops a framework in which agents
face multiperiod decision problems and have subjective expectations.
It shows that the aggregation of rationally formed decisions of indi-
vidual agents with such subjective expectations implies that cur-
rent output and inﬂation are determined by long-horizon forecasts
of general macroeconomic conditions. The remainder of the paper is
devoted to the question of whether certain policy rules in such an
economy lead the learning dynamics to converge to the dynamics
predicted by rational expectations equilibrium analysis—that is, in
the language of the previous section, whether given suﬃcient data
agents adopt perceived laws of motion that converge to the actual
laws of motion of the economy.
Since Taylor (1993) there has been a revived interest in mone-
tary policy rules, both as a prescriptive and descriptive tool. Taylor
proposed a simple rule of the form
it = ı¯t + ψππt + ψxxt (27)
prescribing the nominal interest rate to be adjusted in response to
variations in inﬂation and in the output gap and ı¯t is a stochastic
constant.7 This work and Taylor (1999) provides evidence that a
rule of this form gives a remarkably good characterization of U.S.
monetary policy from the mid-1980s onward. More generally, some
have argued that interest-rate rules should be an integral part of a
framework for monetary policy, as such rules provide a possible so-
lution to the pitfalls of discretionary behavior by the central bank:
by providing a systematic response to economic shocks, the cen-
tral bank might be better able to stabilize inﬂation and output and
7The actual rule proposed by Taylor (1993) was it = πt +0.5(πt − 2) + 0.5xt ,
interpreting πt as the four-quarter-ended inﬂation rate.
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therefore improve social welfare. Furthermore, by specifying the op-
timal choice of the nominal interest rate in each state of the world,
interest-rate rules can, in principle, be designed to implement opti-
mal monetary policy. Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler (1999) and Wood-
ford (2003) develop these ideas in considerable detail and present
a coherent theory of monetary policy that makes the case for such
rules.
However, much of the literature on monetary policy rules regard-
ing the desirability of one rule versus another rests on the assumption
of rational expectations. And while rational expectations has obvi-
ous appeal as a modeling device, there is good reason to be cautious
about policy recommendations derived under its assumption. The
model of this paper provides a natural framework to evaluate the de-
sirability of monetary policy rules given alternative assumptions on
the expectations formation mechanism. Indeed, the adaptive learn-
ing framework has considerable appeal, as it includes the rational
expectations paradigm as a special limiting case. It follows that such
an expectations formation mechanism presents a minimal deviation
from rational expectations and, therefore, that any rules that are
found to induce economic instability under its assumption are likely
to be undesirable as a recommended policy. Indeed, Howitt (1992),
Evans and Honkapohja (2003), and Bullard and Mitra (2002) argue
convergence of least-squares learning to the predictions of rational
expectations equilibrium analysis to be a minimal requirement of
any proposed policy.
The use of interest-rate rules as a means to conduct monetary
policy has also been criticized on the grounds that even though a pol-
icy is consistent with a desirable equilibrium, it will almost surely
have disastrous consequences in practice by allowing for self-fulﬁlling
expectations to propagate. For example, Friedman (1968) argued
that any attempt by the monetary authority to peg the nominal
interest rate, even at an optimally chosen value, would inevitably
lead to economic instability via a cumulative Wicksellian process.
Following Howitt (1992), the basic logic of this criticism can be
neatly formulated in a model where agents form expectations of
the future path of the economy by extrapolating from historical re-
lationships in observed data. The remaining analysis examines the
possibility of self-fulﬁlling expectations when agents must form long-
horizon forecasts in order to make current decisions. Thus, given
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a candidate monetary policy, the central question of interest is
whether, given suﬃcient data, agents with subjective expectations
will be able to learn the predictions of rational expectations equilib-
rium analysis.
4.1 Monetary Policy Rules
Consider two classes of instrument rules: (1) nominal interest-rate
rules that depend only on the history of exogenous disturbances and
(2) Taylor-type feedback rules that specify a path for the nominal
interest rate that depends on the path of endogenous variables. The
former class of rule is of considerable interest since specifying the
optimal action of the monetary authority in each state of the world is
a natural way to implement optimal monetary policy. However, such
rules are an example of the type of rule critiqued by Friedman (1968)
and have also been criticized by Sargent and Wallace (1975), who
showed that commitment to exogenously determined interest-rate
paths can lead to indeterminacy of rational expectations equilibria.
The possibility of indeterminacy of rational expectations equilibria
raises an important challenge for the design of optimal monetary
policy as underscored by the work of Svensson and Woodford (2002),
Woodford (1999), Giannoni and Woodford (2002a), and Giannoni
and Woodford (2002b): even though an optimal interest-rate rule,
expressed as a function of the history of exogenous disturbances, can
be designed to be consistent with the optimal equilibrium, such rules
are also equally consistent with many other undesirable equilibria. In
the context of the monetary policy literature under learning, Evans
and Honkapohja (2003) have demonstrated an analogous result: such
policy rules are in fact subject to self-fulﬁlling expectations as argued
by Friedman.
Importantly, indeterminacy of rational expectations equilibrium
is not a general property of interest-rate rules. McCallum (1983)
showed that rules that allow appropriate feedback from endogenous
variables can deliver a unique equilibrium. As mentioned, a promi-
nent recent example due to Taylor (1993) is given by (27). Woodford
(2003, chap. 4) shows that this rule leads to determinacy of rational
expectations equilibrium if the so-called Taylor principle is satisﬁed.
This rule will be the central focus of our study of learning dynamics
in this economy.
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There are clearly many other possible rules for the conduct of
monetary policy. Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler (1998) and Clarida, Gal´ı,
and Gertler (2000) have found that estimated central bank reaction
functions often ﬁnd an important role for expectations of future in-
ﬂation in the setting of the current interest rate. This suggests rules
of the form
it = ı¯t + ψxEtxt+1 + ψπEtπt+1 (28)
to be of practical interest.8
Alternatively, as argued by McCallum (1999), the informational
assumptions implicit in the Taylor rule are tenuous in practice. Mon-
etary authorities typically do not have available current-dated obser-
vations on the output gap and inﬂation rate when setting the current
interest rate. Many researchers have responded to this criticism by
modifying the information set available to the monetary authority
when determining its instrument setting. Hence, the nominal inter-
est rate could be argued to be better modeled as being determined
by lagged expectations of current-dated output and inﬂation to give
an instrument rule of the form
it = ı¯t + ψxEt−1xt + ψπEt−1πt. (29)
Finally, for a monetary authority concerned with stabilizing vari-
ation in output and inﬂation, the optimal commitment equilibrium
in the present model under rational expectations can be shown to be
implemented by a rule of the form
it =
1
σ
[
Etxt+1 − λ
λ + κ2
xt−1 +
(
βκ
λ + κ2
+ σ
)
Etπt+1
+
κ
λ + κ2
ut + rnt
]
,
where λ gives the weight placed on stabilizing output variation and
ut a cost-push shock.9 All three classes of monetary policy rules cer-
tainly warrant careful analysis when private agents have subjective
8This is not the form of rule that these authors ﬁnd best characterizes the
central bank’s policy reaction function. It is presented as being illustrative of a
type of rule that might be of practical interest.
9As done in many recent analyses of this model under rational expections, a
cost-push shock can be introduced into the aggregate supply curve to ensure a
nontrivial optimal monetary policy problem.
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expectations and these rules are interpreted as responding to ob-
served private forecasts. Indeed, Evans and Honkapohja (2002) and
Bullard and Mitra (2002) have examined rules of these types under
learning dynamics in the context of a model where expectations of
inﬂation and output one period in advance matter. In the context of
the model of this paper, analysis of these rules leads to quite diﬀerent
conclusions about their desirability as a guideline for the conduct of
monetary policy. For this reason, discussion of these classes of rules is
contained in companion papers, Preston (forthcoming) and Preston
(2004), that seek to understand the desirability of central bank de-
cision procedures that attempt to implement monetary policy using
forecast-based instrument rules.
4.2 Learning Dynamics
4.2.1 Exogenous Interest-Rate Processes
To begin analysis of the model under learning, consider a monetary
policy speciﬁed as a commitment to an instrument rule of the form
it = ı¯t + ψc + ψrr
n
t (30)
that posits the nominal interest rate to be set in response to the dis-
turbance in the natural rate of interest. In the following propositions,
we assume the exogenous variables (¯ıt, rnt ) are determined as ı¯t
rnt
 = f ′st,
redeﬁning f as an (n× 2) matrix and with st determined as in (21).
This postulates both the natural rate disturbance and the stochastic
constant of the Taylor rule to be a particular linear combination of
the elements of the disturbance vector st.
Proposition 1. Under the interest-rate rule (30), the associated
REE of the economy given by (18) and (19) is linear in the state vari-
ables st and is not E-stable under least-squares learning dynamics.
Proof. It is easy to verify the existence of an REE that is linear
in the state variable, st. Therefore, assume that agents have forecast
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functions of the form (24). Substituting the assumed instrument rule
and forecast functions (24) into the system (18), (19) gives
zt = Aat−1 + {terms independent of at−1}, (31)
where
A =

(1−α)β
1−αβ +
κσ
1−β
καβ
1−αβ + κ − κσβ1−β
σ
1−β 1 − σβ1−β
0 0 0
 .
Leading (31) and taking expectations delivers the optimal forecast of
the evolution of the endogenous variables given the current forecast
parameters of private agents. The required mapping between the per-
ceived and optimal laws of motion follows immediately. E-stability
requires det(A− I) < 0, but
det(A− I) = κσ
1− β +
αβκσ
(1− β)(1− αβ) > 0.
The desired result follows.
Not only do exogenous interest-rate rules suﬀer from an inde-
terminacy of equilibrium, but also any such equilibrium fails to
be expectationally stable, giving credence to Friedman’s critique of
nominal interest-rate pegs (a form of interest-rate rule).10 This re-
sult is related to that of Evans and Honkapohja (2003), who ﬁnd an
analogous result in the context of a model with a more restrictive
class of learning dynamics. The present paper assumes agents know
less about the economy and, as one might expect, this does not make
agents better able to learn the rational expectations equilibrium. It
is also worth noting that one of the motivations of the bounded ra-
tionality literature in macroeconomics was the possibility that learn-
ing mechanisms would provide an equilibrium selection criterion in
the case of multiple rational expectations equilibria.11 In the con-
text of this model, learning is not able to overcome indeterminacy of
equilibrium induced by an exogenous interest-rate rule.
10Honkapohja and Mitra (2004) also show in their model that all
nonfundamentals-based equilibria are unstable under learning dynamics. How-
ever, given that no rational expectations equilibria are then learnable in that
model, this class of rule has little to recommend itself.
11Sargent (1993) provides several examples where learning dynamics provide a
criterion for equilibrium selection.
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Proposition 1 also implies that to design optimal monetary policy
rules, it is generally not enough to specify a rule in terms of exoge-
nous disturbances to implement optimal monetary policy. While such
rules are consistent with the desired equilibrium, they are equally
consistent with the propagation of self-fulﬁlling expectations. The
challenge to design rules that are immune to such instability is taken
up in Preston (2004) and Preston (forthcoming).
4.2.2 The Taylor Rule
In contrast to interest-rate rules that depend only on the history
of exogenous disturbances, Taylor rules can deliver determinacy of
rational expectations equilibrium so long as the Taylor principle is
satisﬁed. Under learning dynamics, the Taylor principle is necessary
and suﬃcient for E-stability.
Proposition 2. Suppose agents construct forecasts using the
perceived law of motion given by (24). Under the Taylor rule (27), the
model given by (18) and (19) has minimum-state-variable rational
expectations equilibria that are linear in the state variables, st, for
which the Taylor principle
κ(ψπ − 1) + (1− β)ψx > 0
is necessary and suﬃcient for E-stability under least-squares learning
dynamics.
Proof. A sketch of the proof now follows. Appendix 4 shows that
the E-stability mapping implies the associated ordinary diﬀerential
equation
∂φ
∂τ
=
 A3 − I3 0
0 H3n − I3n
φ,
where φ =
(
a′, vec (b)′
)′, all matrices are square and of indicated di-
mension, and I is an identity matrix. E-stability requires all 3n + 3
eigenvalues of this system to have negative real parts. It is immediate
that the eigenvalues are determined by the properties of the matrices
A3 − I3 and H3n − I3n. The proof establishes that these two matri-
ces have negative real roots so long as the Taylor principle holds.
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The following treats the matrix A3 − I3, which characterizes the
stability properties of the constant dynamics, leaving H3n − I3n to
appendix 4.
Since the constant dynamics are independent of the dynam-
ics describing the forecast parameters vec (b) , we can analyze the
subsystem
∂a
∂τ
= [A3 − I3] a.
Noting that an REE implies the coeﬃcient restriction ai = ψxax +
ψπaπ, make a change of variables according to the relation aj =
ψxax + ψπaπ − ai, where aj = bj = 0 in an REE. This yields the
system
∂a˜
∂τ
=
 A˜− I2 A˜2
0 −1
 a˜,
where a˜ = (aπ, ax, aj)
′ and all matrices are of dimension (2× 2). A˜2
has elements that are composites of model primitives. The matrix A˜
can be shown to have elements
a˜11 = (κσ (1− αβ) (1− βψπ) + β (1− α) (1− β) (1 + βσψx)) /Γ1
a˜12 = κ (1− β(1 + (1− α)σψx) /Γ1
a˜21 = σ
(
1− αβ (1− ψπ)− 2βψπ + β2ψπ
)
/Γ1
a˜22 = ((1− β) (1− αβ)− σβψx (1− αβ)− αβκσψπ (1− β)) /Γ1,
where
Γ1 = (1− β) (1− αβ) (1 + σψx + σκψπ)
and aij denotes the (i, j) element of the matrix A˜.
For E-stability, the Jacobian D ∂a˜∂τ must have roots with nega-
tive real parts. It is immediate that one root is equal to negative
unity. A˜− I2 must have positive determinant and negative trace for
the remaining two eigenvalues to have the desired property. These
restrictions imply the inequalities
ψπ +
(1− β)
κ
ψx > 1
and
ψπ +
ψx
κ
· (1− αβ) + (1− β)
2
(1− αβ) + (1− β) >
κσ(1− αβ)− (1− β)2
κσ [(1− αβ) + (1− β)] ,
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respectively. The ﬁrst inequality clearly establishes the Taylor prin-
ciple to be necessary for E-stability. To show that it is suﬃcient, note
that the right-hand side of the second restriction is necessarily less
than one. Furthermore, the slope coeﬃcient on the parameter ψx is
necessarily greater than (1− β) /κ; for it to be less than this value
requires β < 0, contradicting the maintained model assumptions.
It follows that any policy parameter pairs (ψx, ψπ) satisfying the
Taylor principle must also satisfy this second inequality. Appendix
4 applies similar arguments to the restrictions implied by H3n − I3n
to establish the desired result.
To give some intuition, particularly for the presence of the eigen-
values equal to negative one, which relate to learning the interest-
rate dynamics, consider the following. Suppose that agents, serendip-
itously, happen to forecast a nominal interest-rate path coinciding
with what would be determined by the Taylor rule given the agents’
forecasts for the output gap and inﬂation. It follows that the economy
would produce data for the output gap and inﬂation that are in turn
consistent with estimating parameters that would generate forecasts
in subsequent periods for the path of the nominal interest rate that
would again be obtained under the Taylor rule. It follows that the
Taylor rule itself cannot be a source of instability, and agents—by
observing the realized values for output, inﬂation, and the nominal
interest rate—can easily discern the restriction between these vari-
ables that is required by the Taylor rule in a rational expectations
equilibrium. It follows that only the inﬂation and output gap dy-
namics are relevant for E-stability. This basic insight is important
more generally: Preston (forthcoming) shows that a common prop-
erty of desirable optimal monetary policies is that they ensure that
the instrument rule itself is not a source of instability—that is, the
associated eigenvalues are independent of private agents’ beliefs as
for the Taylor rule examined here.
Bullard and Mitra (2002) show a similar result in a learning
analysis based on equations (13) and (14) and assuming the nat-
ural rate, rnt , to be speciﬁed as an AR (1) stochastic process. It
should be emphasized that this is not obviously to be expected.
The framework given by (18) and (19) allows for both signiﬁcantly
more general out-of-equilibrium behavior, with output, inﬂation,
and the nominal interest rate depending on average expecta-
tions of these same variables into the indeﬁnite future and a more
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general stochastic process for the disturbances. The presence of ad-
ditional expectational variables relative to the analysis of Bullard
and Mitra (2002) is a potential source of instability under learning
dynamics. That the Taylor principle continues to be the relevant
condition for E-stability in the more general framework developed in
this paper suggests it to be a robust result for this class of instrument
rule.
As discussed by Honkapohja and Mitra (2004), results of this
kind also provide an alternative interpretation of the performance
of monetary policy in the United States in the 1970s relative to
later decades. Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler (1998) argue that the in-
ﬂationary episode of the 1970s was the result of a monetary pol-
icy that was not consistent with a determinate price level. As a
result, the economy was prone to “sunspot” equilibria and self-
fulﬁlling expectations. In contrast, the results of this paper suggest
that an equally consistent interpretation of this episode is that mon-
etary policy, rather than inducing indeterminacy, was conducive to
agents expecting ever higher inﬂation on the basis of their expe-
rience with past inﬂation—and hence to propagating self-fulﬁlling
expectations.
5. Conclusion
This paper develops a framework to analyze the robustness of mone-
tary policy rules to an important source of model misspeciﬁcation—
the assumed form of expectations formation. The principal contri-
bution is methodological in nature: the solution to a simple mi-
crofounded model under a nonrational expectations assumption.
Analysis of the multiperiod decision problems of households and
ﬁrms under subjective beliefs shows that the predicted aggregate
model dynamics are qualitatively diﬀerent from those obtained un-
der rational expectations. Indeed, the determination of inﬂation and
output depends on the average of agents’ long-horizon forecasts of
the model’s endogenous variables into the indeﬁnite future.
The principal substantive contribution is the analysis of whether
instrument rules that have been of particular interest to the mone-
tary policy literature over the past decade are robust to deviations
from rational expectations. When policy is speciﬁed as a commitment
to an exogenous interest-rate rule, agents are unable to learn the
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associated rational expectations dynamics. Such rules are therefore
undesirable both due to inducing multiple equilibria under ratio-
nal expectations and to being subject to the Friedman (1968) cri-
tique that nominal interest-rate rules of this type are subject to self-
fulﬁlling expectations. In contrast, for Taylor-type feedback rules,
agents are able to learn the associated rational expectations dynam-
ics so long as the Taylor principle is satisﬁed. Interestingly, this ﬁnd-
ing is invariant to a number of diﬀerent information assumptions
on the agent’s forecasting model, making it a robust feature of the
policy environment in this model. This suggests the Taylor rule to
be desirable from the point of view of eliminating instability due to
self-fulﬁlling expectations.
Companion papers, Preston (2004) and Preston (forthcoming),
demonstrate for a number of more complicated rules that conclusions
diﬀer markedly in the framework developed here as compared to
the Euler equation approach to modeling learning. The latter paper
shows that forecast-based instrument rules, including the classes of
rules proposed by Bullard and Mitra (2002) and Evans and Honkapo-
hja (2002), are frequently prone to self-fulﬁlling expectations in the
present model if the central bank responds to observed private-sector
forecasts. However, if the central bank responds to the determinants
of these expectations, this instability can be mitigated. The former
paper shows that optimal monetary policy can always be imple-
mented using speciﬁc targeting rules if the central bank correctly
understands agents’ behavior. However, without such knowledge, de-
cision procedures that seek to control directly the path of the price
level, rather than the inﬂation rate, tend to perform better under
learning dynamics, even though these policies are equivalent in terms
of the rational expectations equilibrium they imply.
Appendix 1. Household Optimality
Deﬁning W it+1 = (1 + i
m
t )M
i
t + (1 + it)B
i
t as the total beginning-of-
period wealth at time t + 1 allows the ﬂow budget constraint (2) to
be written as
PtC
i
t + ∆tM
i
t +
1
1 + it
·W it+1 ≤ W it +
[
PtY
i
t − Tt
]
, (32)
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where
∆t ≡ it − im1 + it
is the opportunity cost of holding wealth in a monetary form. Since
(32) must hold in all states, s, and dates, t, the ﬂow budget constraint
can be solved forward recursively, given the appropriate no-Ponzi
constraint limj→∞Rt,t+jWt+j+1 = 0, to give
W it ≥
∞∑
j=0
Rt,t+j
[
Pt+jC
i
t+j + ∆t+jM
i
t+j − (Pt+jY it+j − Tt+j)
]
,
where
Rt,t+j =
j∏
s=1
(
1
1 + it+s−1
)
.
Standard analysis shows that household intertemporal optimality
is characterized by the ﬁrst-order conditions for consumption and
labor supply:
1
1 + it
= βEt[
Pt
Pt+1
· Uc(C
i
t+1, ξt+1)
Uc(Cit ; ξt)
] (33)
and
vh(ht(j); ξt)
uc(Cit ; ξt)
=
wt(j)
Pt
(34)
for dates, t, and goods j ∈ [0, 1]. Since we are assuming a cashless
economy, where the transaction frictions that money is usually held
to mitigate are essentially zero, optimization also requires
M it = 0
or
it = imt .
In each period t, households also face the intratemporal problem
of allocating expenditures across goods j. Optimality for all j ∈ [0, 1]
implies
ct(j) = Cit
(
pt(j)
Pt
)−θ
(35)
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so that total expenditure is given by PtCit .
12 To obtain the total
consumption demand for good j, integrate over i to obtain
ct(j) = Ct
(
pt(j)
Pt
)−θ
,
introducing the notation
∫
i z
i
tdi = zt for any variable z. In equilib-
rium, markets must clear for each good and aggregate output. This
requires yt (j) = ct (j) for all j and Ct = Yt. Substitution of the
market-clearing conditions into the above relation gives the demand
curve for output produced by ﬁrm j. Asset market clearing implies
Mt = M st and Bt = B
s
t , where
∫
Bitdi = Bt and similarly for Mt.
Since M st > 0, this implies it = i
m
t . Finally, the intertemporal budget
constraint and the transversality condition must hold with equality.
Since we have a zero-debt ﬁscal policy with bonds in zero net supply,
it follows that
Tt = (1 + it−1)Mt−1 −Mt
so that the intertemporal budget constraint can be written as
W it =
∞∑
j=0
Rt,t+j
[
Pt+jC
i
t+j − Pt+jY it+j
]
,
redeﬁning W it ≡ (1 + it−1)Bt−1.
To obtain a log-linear approximation to the household’s decision
problem, deﬁne the linearization point to be the steady state char-
acterized by ξt = 0 and Yt = Y¯ (deﬁned in appendix 2) for all t.13
Inspection of the household’s ﬁrst-order conditions implies a solution
of the form πt = Pt/Pt−1 = 1, and ı¯t = β−1 − 1 for all t, where a
bar denotes steady-state value. For any variable z, deﬁne log devia-
tion as zˆt ≡ log(zt/z¯), except for the nominal interest rate for which
ıˆ = log[(1 + i)/(1 + ı¯)] is used.14 The analysis seeks a log-linear
12Total expenditure is obtained by multiplying (35) by pt(j) and integrating
over j. Applying the deﬁnition of the price index delivers the result.
13Given that this paper explores a form of bounded rationality that is a minimal
deviation from rational expectations, and, moreover, that the analysis will be later
concerned with whether an economy under learning dynamics can converge to the
associated rational expectations equilibrium, the linearization point is chosen to
coincide with that same rational expectations equilibrium.
14Thus all hatted variables are interpreted as percentage deviations. The nom-
inal interest rate is treated diﬀerently so that it corresponds to percentage point
deviations of the continuously compounded nominal interest rate.
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solution in which all variables ﬂuctuate forever near these steady-
state values.
Appendix 2. Firm Problem
This appendix characterizes the ﬁrm’s optimal pricing problem, de-
ﬁnes the notion of the natural rate of output, and provides some
details of the log-linear relations used in section 1.2. For a thorough
analysis, see Woodford (2003, chap. 3). Diﬀerentiating (8) with re-
spect to pt(i) gives ﬁrm i’s ﬁrst-order condition,
Eˆit
∞∑
T=t
αT−tQt,TYTP θT [pˆ
∗
t (i)− µPT st,T (i)] = 0, (36)
where µ = θ/(θ − 1), st,T (i) the ﬁrm i’s real marginal cost func-
tion (deﬁned below) in period T ≥ t given the optimal price p∗t (i)
determined in period t. To derive a log-linear approximation to the
ﬁrm’s optimal pricing condition, recall that the steady state is de-
ﬁned as ξt = 0 and Yt = Y¯ for all t. Inspection of (36) indicates
there exists a solution with p∗t /Pt = Pt/Pt−1 = 1 in each period t.
Therefore, we look for a log-linear approximation in which Pt/Pt−1
and p∗t /Pt remain forever close to one. Before deriving this log-linear
approximation, several other useful relations are derived.
Combining the household’s optimal labor supply condition (34)
with the ﬁrm’s production function and diﬀerentiating with respect
to pt(i) gives the ﬁrm’s real marginal cost function
s(y, Y ; ξ˜) =
vh(f−1(y/A; ξ))
uc(Y ; ξ)A
· 1
f ′(f−1(y))
, (37)
where ξ˜ ≡ (At, ξt)′ is a composite vector of all preference and tech-
nology shocks. Real marginal costs therefore depend on both ﬁrm-
speciﬁc and aggregate conditions.
Now suppose that ﬁrms have full information about the current
state of the economy and are able to set prices each period—the case
of fully ﬂexible price setting. Then, a standard result from a model of
monopolistic competition is that prices are optimally set according
to the mark-up relation pt(i)Pt =
θ
θ−1 · s(yt(i), Yt; ξ˜t) = µs(yt(i), Yt; ξ˜t).
Under this assumption on price-setting behavior, ﬁrms—regardless
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of beliefs—face a symmetric problem. It follows that, in equilibrium,
pt (i) = Pt and yt (i) = Yt for all i and t, and combining with the
optimality condition (36) implies
s(Y nt , Y
n
t ; ξ˜t) = µ
−1, (38)
where the level of output Y nt that satisﬁes this condition is called the
natural rate of output. It is the rate of output that occurs under fully
ﬂexible prices and varies in accordance with fundamental shocks ξ˜t.
The quantity of output, Y¯t, used in the deﬁnition of the steady state
satisﬁes s(Y¯ , Y¯ ; 0) = µ−1.
To obtain a log-linear approximation to (36), log-linearize equa-
tion (37) to give
sˆt,T (i) = ωyˆT (i) + σ−1YˆT − (ω + σ−1)Yˆ nT .
It follows that the real marginal cost of producing average or aggre-
gate output, yt (i) = Yt, is
sˆT (i) = (ω + σ−1)(YˆT − Yˆ nT ) = (ω + σ−1)xT ,
where the latter equality implicitly deﬁnes the output gap xt =
Yˆt − Yˆ nt . This provides a relationship between the marginal cost of
producing output yt(i) and the average marginal cost of producing
total output Yˆt of the following form:
sˆt,T (i) = sˆT − ωθ
[
pt (i)−
T∑
τ=t+1
πτ
]
, (39)
making clear that a ﬁrm’s marginal cost in producing its good diﬀers
from average marginal cost to the extent that its price diﬀers from
the aggregate price.
Substituting into the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst-order condition, (36), for the dis-
count factor using (33), linearizing and substituting for real marginal
costs using (39) gives the prediction that optimal price of ﬁrm i sat-
isﬁes the approximate log-linear relation
p̂∗t (i) = Eˆ
i
t
∞∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t
[
1− αβ
1 + ωθ
· (ω + σ−1)xT + αβπˆT+1
]
.
Thus ﬁrm i’s optimal price is determined as a linear function of
the future expected paths of the output gap and inﬂation. Variation
in the optimal prices set by ﬁrms in period t can be due only to
diﬀerences in beliefs.
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Appendix 3. Conditions for Eigenvalues to Have
Negative Real Parts
Consider the matrix A with dimension (3× 3) . From |A− λI| = 0,
the characteristic equation is
λ3 − c1λ2 + c2λ− c3 = 0,
where c1 = Trace(A), c2 is the sum of all second-order principal mi-
nors of A, and c3 = |A|. The following restrictions on the coeﬃcients
ci must be satisﬁed for all eigenvalues to have negative real parts:
c1 < 0
c3 − c1c2 > 0
c3 < 0.
For a matrix A with dimension (2× 2) , |A− λI| = 0 implies the
characteristic equation is
λ2 − c1λ + c2 = 0,
where c1 = Trace(A) and c2 = |A|. For both eigenvalues to have
negative real parts, c1 < 0 and c2 > 0 must be satisﬁed.
Appendix 4. Proof of Proposition 2
Agents are assumed to construct forecasts according to the relation
EtzT+1 = az + bzCT−tst, (40)
where zT = (πT , xT , iT )
′and az and bz are estimated coeﬃcient ma-
trices of appropriate dimension. It follows that
Eˆt
∞∑
T=t
βT−tzT+1 = az (1− β)−1 + bz (In − βC)−1 st
and
Eˆt
∞∑
T=t
(αβ)T−tzT+1 = az (1− αβ)−1 + bz (In − αβC)−1 st.
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Denoting these inﬁnite sums by fβ and fα, respectively, and substi-
tuting into (18) and (19) implies:
xt = −σψπ
w
[(1− α)β, καβ, β] · fα
+
1
w
[σ, (1− β) ,−σ] · fβ − σ
w
· [1 − 1]fγ
πt =
(
1− κσψπ
w
)
[(1− α)β, καβ, β] · fα
+
κ
w
[σ, (1− β) ,−σ] · fβ − κσ
w
· [1 − 1]fγ ,
where w = 1 + σψx + σκψπ and
fγ = f ′ (In − βC)−1 st.
Recalling that the nominal interest rate is given by the Taylor rule
it = ı¯t + ψππt + ψxxt,
the system can be written compactly as
zt = A1fα + A2fβ + A3fγ ,
where A1, A2, and A3 collect obvious coeﬃcients and have dimension
(3× 3). Substituting for fα, fβ , fγ gives
zt =
[
(1− αβ)−1 A1 + (1− β)−1 A2
]
az
+
[
A1bz (1− αβC)−1 + A2bz (1− β)−1 + A3f ′ (In − βC)−1
]
st.
This expression combined with (40) for T = t deﬁnes the E-stability
mapping from current private forecast parameters to the optimal
forecast coeﬃcients as
T
 az
bz
 =
 [(1− αβ)−1 A1 + (1− β)−1 A2] az[
A1bz (1− αβC)−1 + A2bz (1− β)−1
]
C
 .
The associated ordinary diﬀerential equation can then be written as
∂φ
∂τ
=
 A− I3 0
0 H − I3n
φ,
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where φ =
(
a′z, vec (bz)
′)′ and
A = (1− αβ)−1 A1 + (1− β)−1 A2
H =
[
(In − αβCn)−1 Cn
]′ ⊗A1 + [(In − βCn)−1 Cn]′ ⊗A2
are (3× 3) and (3n× 3n) matrices, respectively. The Jacobian is
then given as
D
∂φ
∂τ
=
 A− I3 0
0 H − I3n
 .
To complete the proof of this proposition, it remains to consider
the properties of the eigenvalues of the matrix H − I3n, since A− I3
was considered in the main text. Note that C can be diagonalized to
give
C = SΛS−1, (41)
where Λ is a diagonal matrix with elements given by the eigenvalues,
ρk, of C, and S is a matrix composed of the corresponding eigenvec-
tors, vk. Also note that we can write
(In − αβC)−1 C = SΛ (In − αβΛ)−1 S−1
(In − βC)−1 C = SΛ (In − βΛ)−1 S−1.
The matrix H can therefore be written as
H =
[
SΛ (In − αβΛ)−1 S−1
]′ ⊗A1
+
[
SΛ (In − βΛ)−1 S−1
]′ ⊗A2
=
(
S−1′ ⊗ I3
) [
Λ (In − αβΛ)−1 ⊗A1
+ Λ(In − βΛ)−1 ⊗A2
] (
S′ ⊗ I3
)
.
Note that
G ≡ Λ (In − αβΛ)−1 ⊗A1 + Λ(In − βΛ)−1 ⊗A2
is block diagonal with elements
Gk (ρk) = ρk (1− αβρk)−1 ⊗A1 + ρk (1− βρk)−1 ⊗A2,
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where each Gk (ρk) is (3× 3). Let vk be an eigenvector of C asso-
ciated with the eigenvalue ρk and let λi (ρk) be an eigenvector of
the associated diagonal block Gk (ρk) (note that there are three such
eigenvectors).
Conjecture that the matrix H has eigenvectors of the form vk ⊗
λi (ρk). Then, in the particular case of v1 ⊗ λi (ρ1) (where, without
loss of generality, assume ρ1 to be the ﬁrst diagonal element of Λ
and v1 the ﬁrst column vector of S), we have
(v1 ⊗ λi (ρ1))′H = (v1 ⊗ λi (ρ1))′
(
S−1′ ⊗ I2
) [
Λ (In − αβΛ)−1
⊗ A1 + Λ(In − βΛ)−1 ⊗A2
] (
S′ ⊗ I2
)
= (
(
S−1v1)′ ⊗ λi (ρ1)′
) [
Λ (In − αβΛ)−1 ⊗A1
+ Λ(In − βΛ)−1 ⊗A2
] (
S′ ⊗ I2
)
= [λi (ρ1)
′ ...01×(3n−3)]
[
Λ (In − αβΛ)−1 ⊗A1
+ Λ(In − βΛ)−1 ⊗A2
] (
S′ ⊗ I2
)
= [λi (ρ1)
′G1 (ρ1)
...01×(3n−3)]
(
S′ ⊗ I2
)
= [λi (ρ1)
′ γi (ρ1)
... 01×(3n−3)]
(
S′ ⊗ I2
)
= γi (ρ1) (v1 ⊗ λi (ρ1))′ .
Thus v1⊗λi (ρ1) is in fact an eigenvector of H with associated eigen-
value γi (ρ1). Since for each ρk there are three eigenvalues γi (ρk)
and corresponding eigenvectors vk and λi (ρk) , there are therefore
3n eigenvectors of the form vk ⊗ λi (ρk) that span the space of H.
To complete the proof requires demonstrating that all 3n eigen-
values γi (ρk) are less than unity. Consider the properties of the
matrix
Gk (ρk)− I3
formed from the kth diagonal block of G. Using Mathematica, it is
easily shown that one eigenvalue (corresponding to the coeﬃcient
relevant to the interest-rate dynamics) is equal to negative unity,
while the remaining two have properties determined by the quadratic
equation
aλ2 + bλ + c.
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A suﬃcient condition for there to be two roots with negative real
parts is a, b, c > 0. It is easily shown that
a = (1− βρk) (1− αβρk) (1 + σψx + κσψπ) .
For the remaining two conditions to hold, the restrictions
ψπ +
(1− βρk)
κ
ψx > ρk −
(1− ρk) (1− βρk)
κσ
and
ψπ +
ψx
κ
· (1− αβρk) + (1− βρk)
2
(1− αβρk) + (1− βρk)
>
κσ(1− αβρk)−
[
(1− αβρk)(1− ρk) + (1− βρk)2
]
κσ [(1− αβρk) + (1− βρk)]
must be satisﬁed. To show that satisfaction of the Taylor principle is
necessary and suﬃcient for this ﬁrst restriction to hold, note that the
constant term of ﬁrst inequality is less than unity by inspection and
that the slope coeﬃcient on ψx is necessarily greater than (1− β) /κ
for ρk ∈ (−1, 1). Thus for all positive (ψπ, ψx) , the Taylor principle
ensures satisfaction of this inequality. Finally, consider the second
inequality above. The constant is again less than unity by inspection.
For the Taylor principle to be suﬃcient, consider the slope coeﬃcient.
If the restriction
(1− αβρk) + (1− βρk)2
(1− αβρk) + (1− βρk)
> 1− β
holds, then the Taylor principle is indeed suﬃcient. Rearranging
yields the restriction
f (ρk) ≡ β (1− αβρk) + (1− βρk)2 − (1− β) (1− βρk) > 0,
which satisﬁes f (−1) , f (0) , f (1) > 0. Since f ′ (ρk) < 0 for all
ρk ∈ (−1, 1), f (ρk) > 0 for all ρk ∈ (−1, 1). The Taylor principle
is therefore necessary and suﬃcient for the restrictions b, c > 0 to
hold. Thus, all eigenvalues of Gk (ρk) − I3 have negative real parts
and Gk (ρk) all have eigenvalues less than unity if and only if the
Taylor principle holds. It follows that all eigenvalues of H must be
less than unity and, therefore, that the eigenvalues of H − I3n all
have negative real parts. The conditions for E-stability are therefore
satisﬁed if and only if the Taylor principle holds.
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